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Abstract 
New Zealand marine fishing activities create many types of environmental externalities, 
which by law must be internalised. Selection of best internalisation instruments can be aided 
by following a hierarchical decision process, which first screens the universe of instruments 
against implementation criteria to establish the feasible set.  Instruments in the feasible set 
can be evaluated against a range of environmental, Treaty of Waitangi, economic, socio-
cultural and management criteria. This approach to selection can be formalised in decision 
support software to provide a useful tool for fisheries management agencies.  
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1. Introduction 
New Zealand has the fourth largest exclusive economic zone in the world.  In 1986 the quota 
management system was introduced to promote sustainable management of New Zealand’s 
fishery resources.  New Zealand was amongst the first countries to introduce individual 
property rights-based management on a universal basis. Even though the individual 
transferable quota system has been successful in a number of respects, one of the growing 
concerns during the last decade is environmental externalities associated with the activities of 
commercial fishing. Such concerns have led to a wider focus on the need for sustainable 
management of the marine environment within the exclusive economic zone.  This is 
reflected in the purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act 1996 (Figure 1).  
 
Environmental externalities from fishing comprise a range of diverse events: marine pollution 
from ship’s discharges; bycatch of non-target fish species; damage and mortality to non-fish 
species; and destruction of fish habitat. Hughey et al. (2000) identified the New Zealand 
fisheries in which ‘significant’ externalities occur as: 
 Any bottom dredging fishery on a non silt/sand substrate, e.g. oyster and scallop; 
 Any bottom trawl fishery on a non silt/sand substrate, e.g. snapper and orange roughy; 
 Long line fisheries where there is the presence of non target fish species or seabirds in 
high numbers at the same fishing water level, e.g. tuna; 
 Mid water trawl fisheries where marine mammals occur in ‘significant’ numbers, e.g. 
southern squid; and 
 Gillnet fisheries where dolphins are present, e.g. rig, other small sharks, and kahawai. 
 
Generally, externalities can only be reduced at some cost and there is an economically 
optimal level of externality reduction where the marginal cost of externality reduction equals 
the marginal benefit from externality reduction (Pearce and Turner 1990). Internalisation 
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occurs when institutional change causes formerly external costs associated with fishing to be 
borne by the firm creating the externality. A key point is that fishers’ behaviours or their 
fishing-related activities must change in order to avoid, remedy, or mitigate externalities. 
This can occur if the firms creating the external costs take any of the actions listed below, 
resulting in reduced incidence of the externality creating behaviour: 
 Reduce, stop, or change the pattern or timing of fishing in an area. 
 Change fishing practices to reduce risks of: polluting, harming other species, or 
damaging the sea floor. 
  Change behaviour to avoid catching non-target fish species, to reduce bycatch, and to 
reduce potential discards.  
 Change behaviour once non-target species have been caught. 
 Invest in activities such as stock enhancement or habitat creation to offset negative 
environmental effects. 
 
The objective of this research, commissioned by the Ministry of Fisheries, was to develop a 
decision support system to assist the Ministry to select the best combination of ‘instruments’ 
for internalising the environmental externalities of commercial fishing.   This paper provides 
an outline of the framework and process that have been followed to develop this system. 
 
 
2. Fishery Management Instruments 
Many fishery externality management instruments have been invoked and used around the 
globe, often in an attempt to reduce or prevent excessive harvesting of fish species, although 
some are used specifically to tackle fishing environmental externalities. A large literature 
exists exploring the effectiveness of various fisheries management policy tools and the 
requirements for their success (e.g. Hanna 1997, OECD 1997).  Table 1 describes the 
  
5
attributes of different policy instruments for internalising environmental externalities and 
their applications to fisheries management. 
 
 
3. Evaluation Criteria 
Determination of which instruments are ‘best’ requires criteria to judge performance and data 
to evaluate performance of the instruments. Slooten and Dawson (1995) note the limitations 
of most evaluative studies of the performance of fishery management instruments. Clear and 
robust criteria are necessary to evaluate performance as a basis for selecting appropriate 
management tools. 
 
Five sets of criteria have been analysed to develop a set of specific outcomes against which 
policy instruments may be evaluated. The five criteria areas are; environmental, Treaty of 
Waitangi, economics, socio-cultural, and management. Criteria within each of the sections 
vary in terms of the strength of direction they give, i.e. the environmental and Treaty of 
Waitangi criteria are prescriptive because they are mandatory under existing legislation. 
Economic and social criteria are less prescriptive because policy advisers and decision-
makers have greater latitude to consider these.  Management criteria fall in between.  
 
3.1 Environmental criteria 
The development of environmental criteria requires consideration of: 
 Fisheries Act (1996) and other legislative requirements 
 International treaty obligations 
 Government ‘resource management/environmental’ policy. 
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The Fisheries Act has been developed in an integrated way.  It draws on international 
conventions (e.g. UNCLOS) and is complementary to related legislation (i.e. the Resource 
Management Act 1991) and policy, such as the Environment 2010 Strategy (MfE, 1995).  
Because of this approach to development of the legislation, it has been possible to integrate 
more recent environmental management considerations into development of fisheries policy 
and its implementation.  Specifically, development of the Proposed Environmental 
Performance Indicators of the Marine Environment (MfE, 1998) builds on key Fisheries Act 
requirements. 
 
3.2 Treaty of Waitangi criteria 
The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 is the founding document of New Zealand as a nation. It is part 
of the law of New Zealand to the extent that it is incorporated into statute. A number of 
statutes relating to the marine environment incorporate reference to the principles of the 
Treaty and to the values and traditional relations of Mäori with natural places and resources.  
 
By the Treaty, the Crown confirmed and guaranteed the existing rights of tangata whenua to 
land and resources, including rights in respect of intangible taonga. Mäori tribes have 
guaranteed to them under Article II the right to retain (and have restored to them if taken 
without consent) tribal resources and taonga, and the right to manage them according to their 
cultural preferences. For this reason, it is imperative that the choice of policy instruments to 
address environmental externalities associated with commercial fisheries is assessed in terms 
of implications for Mäori. 
 
3.3 Economic criteria  
There are five broad economic requirements for assessment of the performance of policy 
instruments to address environmental externalities: 
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1. Productive efficiency (including transaction costs) 
2. Encouragement of innovation (dynamic efficiency) 
3. Profitability/International competitiveness 
4. Cost-effectiveness/Least cost policy 
5. Internalisation (full cost principle). 
Cullen et al. (2000) identify what is meant by each of these criteria, and how they may be 
assessed in practice. The key requirement is to find the least economic cost way to achieve 
internalisation of the externalities, when imposing the polluter pays principle. Impacts of each 
policy on transaction costs, market power and windfalls/wipeouts should also be considered. 
 
3.4 Socio-cultural criteria  
There are three major areas for criteria development here: 
1. Community 
2. Protection of access to recreational fishers 
3. Equity 
 
Community 
Introduction of fisheries management policies can have significant effects on some 
communities which are heavily dependent on fishing for employment and income. For 
example, the New Zealand Government removed part time fishers from the industry in 1983 
by declaring all fishers who received less than $10,000 per annum or 80 percent of their 
income from fishing, to no longer be eligible to fish commercially. This action removed 
between 1500 and 1800 fishers from the industry while reducing catch by less than 5% 
(Wallace, 1997). The outcome for those removed was potentially very severe, as many of 
those removed from the industry  lived in poor, isolated communities that did not offer 
alternative employment opportunities. 
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Recreational fishing 
The rights of recreational fishers are different from those of commercial quota holders, and 
have not as yet been well defined. Compared to the commercial quota management system 
and the recently established regulations for Mäori customary fishing, the recreational sector 
has no equivalent framework for precisely determining rights in the marine resource. For 
many New Zealanders, however, the freedom to go fishing is considered a birthright.  
 
Equity 
Equity questions arise not only on the consumption side of public policy (“who benefits?”), 
but also on the production side (“who pays?”). There is no clear right answer to what an 
appropriate distribution of such benefits and costs to society’s members should be. There are, 
however, several principles that can guide consideration of equity issues in the decision 
making process, e.g. Benefits should be distributed equally (the equality principle), or should 
be in proportion to effort, contribution, potential, or other measure of merit (the “just 
desserts” principle). 
 
 
3.5 Management criteria  
Fisheries managers have limited resources available to achieve fishery management 
objectives. They can be expected to prefer internalisation mechanisms which can be 
implemented at moderate cost and are effective in achieving externality internalisation, 
including in less than optimal circumstances.  Fisheries managers frequently consider the 
following ‘managerial’ criteria when evaluating internalisation mechanisms. 
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Introduction and modification 
Some fisheries policies require new legislation. Others can be introduced and varied by a 
change of regulations – a much simpler process. Speedy improvement in situations where 
externalities are present will be favoured by instruments that can be easily introduced and 
varied. 
 
Administration costs 
Administration costs will be determined by the location of the fishery – inshore/mid 
water/deepwater; by the ease or difficulty in achieving compliance with the system; and by 
the costs of monitoring fishing activities. Budgetary pressures will force fisheries managers 
to prefer low administration cost mechanisms. Some mechanisms have potential to be self-
funding by requiring payment of fees by industry participants, increasing their likelihood of 
acceptance by fisheries managers. 
 
Infrastructure requirements  
Some internalisation instruments may require that fisheries managers have specific items of 
equipment. For example, deepwater capable ships may be necessary for monitoring and 
enforcement of some management instruments. Where these are not available to fisheries 
managers, alternative mechanisms must be selected to avoid the infrastructure requirement.  
 
Information requirements 
Section 10 of the Fisheries Act deals with the Information Principles. Regulatory authorities 
often have poor information and this can restrict their ability to successfully apply 
internalisation instruments. Where information availability is weak internalisation 
instruments that make least information demands are likely to be preferred.   
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Performance in sub-optimal conditions 
A first best internalisation instrument in optimal conditions may perform poorly in sub 
optimal conditions. Fisheries managers often operate in second best worlds of limited 
resources, poor information availability, multiple causes of externalities, etc. Fisheries 
management may be best served by versatile internalisation instruments that operate 
satisfactorily in many situations, rather than a mechanism that performs well only in ideal 
conditions.  
 
Pressure on fisheries management staff 
Some fisheries internalisation instruments require frontline staff to tackle risky tasks, or to 
deal with unpleasant situations. These pressures require specially trained fisheries 
management staff, payment of higher wage rates, and their overall effect is to increase costs 
of fisheries management. Internalisation instruments which do not lead to confrontation, do 
not require specially trained staff, or expose fisheries staff to risk, are likely to be more 
attractive to fisheries managers. 
 
An iterative process was used to develop these areas of concern into a list of salient criteria. 
The process entailed ongoing discussions with the Ministry of Fisheries, industry, iwi, NGO 
and recreational interests. The resulting list of criteria is reported in Table 2. 
 
 
4. Decision Support System 
The wide range of potential instruments (22 have been identified in this study, although there 
are many more), the large number of evaluative criteria (19 identified here), and the 
differences in weights that people attach to different evaluative criteria ensure that decision 
making to address fisheries externalities is a highly complex task. The decision support 
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system ‘GoFish’ has been developed to simplify this process and to enhance the quality of 
debate around fishery management decisions (Kerr, Hughey and Cullen, 2000). 
 
GoFish uses a hierarchical structure to simplify the decision making process. The initial step 
is choice of the type of fishery in which the externality occurs (Figure 2), which is necessary 
because the effects of management instruments vary across fishery types. The second step in 
the process is selection of essential characteristics (Figure 3). At this stage, the operator is 
required to identify any outcomes that must be achieved. GoFish then checks to verify that 
there are instruments capable of meeting this requirement. Should there be no instruments 
meeting all critical criteria, the operator is prompted to slacken the criteria until at least one 
viable instrument is identified. The third step in the process is application of a weighted 
matrix scoring system to the subset of viable solutions. Table 2 shows draft effectiveness 
ratings of 22 instruments against 19 criteria, a total of 418 ratings.  These ratings can be 
changed in GoFish. In the final step, one hundred points are allocated by the operator across 
all evaluative criteria, excluding those already deemed to be essential (Figure 4). GoFish 
scores each of the viable solutions and reports them and their scores in order (Figure 5). 
 
GoFish has a wide range of potential applications, e.g. 
 to let parties apply it independently in order to identify differences in criteria weightings 
and therefore to focus debate on key issues; 
 to determine if there are any instruments which will completely resolve a specific fishery 
problem, e.g. mammal bycatch in the trawl fishery;  
 to determine if there are any instruments which might be used extensively to deal with a 
potentially widespread problem, e.g. pollution;  
 to identify the best instruments to deal with issues, even if none of them completely 
resolve that problem, and see how the results change as points allocation is altered;  
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 to identify sets of viable solutions, for example MFish may want to find the set of 
instruments that is 'least cost to them' for a fisheries problem;  
 to use it to defend, or play devils advocate, why a particular instrument is being 
proposed/used in specific cases; and/or  
 to test to see if one or two instruments will be good enough to deal with many problems 
and hence can result in simplified management.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
Characteristics of the decision support system are that it: 
 identifies internalisation instruments that definitely can not meet key criteria; 
 analyses the remainder to identify those that best meet the evaluative criteria; and 
 produces a report that compares the most promising internalisation instruments. 
 
GoFish is an extremely simple tool that is intended to help analysts to clarify issues and not 
to make decisions for managers. It is limited because of its design characteristics, information 
requirements, and inbuilt assumptions. 
 
Design Characteristics 
GoFish looks at using single instruments to address single problems. Clearly, the real world is 
much more complex than this. Most fisheries are characterised by a number of problems and 
experience has shown that solutions that rely upon several instruments often work better than 
application of a single instrument. What is more, fisheries are not discrete and management 
actions designed to address one fishery can have unintended outcomes in another. These 
conditions signal the need to identify a portfolio of management instruments that work in 
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harmony. They also raise the issue about how far one should attempt to go in formulating a 
decision support system. 
 
GoFish is designed as a tool to clarify issues in fisheries management that are not currently 
being addressed. It is helpful because it expands the range of solutions that may be 
considered, and forces people to question their values and the impacts predicted from 
application of particular instruments.  Extension of the system to handle multiple problems 
across several fisheries and to combine instruments would require a much more heroic set of 
assumptions than those already employed. There is a risk that further “black boxing” may 
result in less discussion rather than more. That appears to be an outcome that could seriously 
jeopardise fisheries. If the intent of the decision support system is to mobilise expert 
knowledge, then simple decision support systems, like GoFish, may be superior to more 
complex systems. 
 
Information requirements 
There is a lack of knowledge about many aspects of the environmental impacts of fishing. 
Further, there is little certainty about the relative severity of impacts within or between 
fisheries.  Scientists and managers need to address these issues so that decision makers can be 
assured they are working on the issues of highest priority. In many circumstances we do not 
know the effectiveness of instruments.  Scientists, fishers and fisheries managers need to be 
improving our knowledge base in these areas. There may be a need, given the above, for 
fisheries managers to learn-by-doing to understand the impacts of instrument implementation. 
 
Our evaluation of the effectiveness of instruments within different fishery types is likely to be 
different to evaluations undertaken within the Ministry of Fisheries or by other analysts.  This 
might be interpreted initially as a limitation of the system.  However, upon closer reflection it 
  
14
might better be considered a strength.  This conclusion is reached because differences can 
help expose important tensions – these tensions can then be further explored in trying to seek 
an improved solution to the problem(s) or to identify the areas where information is most in 
need of improvement. Further, different operators will use different criteria scores and critical 
criteria.  Printing them out allows direct comparison of operator differences. 
 
Assumptions 
GoFish employs a linearly additive objective function. Each outcome score is multiplied by 
its weight and all such products are summed to derive the overall score for the instrument. 
The system could potentially be improved by utilisation of a non-linear objective function to 
allow for diminishing marginal benefits. However, the improvement, if any, could be 
illusionary. Another avenue that can go some way to achieving the same ends is to adopt a 
non-linear scoring system for each cell in Table 2. Since the scores included in Table 2 are 
completely subjective, this may explain some of the differences between different analysts 
scoring of instruments against criteria. Consequently, one area for improvement is to 
standardise the scoring process by careful specification of thresholds for each score category. 
However, if a decision support system is to be used to encourage debate about critical issues, 
it may be advantageous for parties with differing views to undertake the scoring together. The 
final scores derived may then have less relevance than the process undertaken to obtain them. 
 
 
6.   Conclusions 
Development of a credible decision support system presents a difficult challenge. One of the 
primary benefits from the development of GoFish has been increased understanding of; the 
complexity of fisheries management, the poor quality of fisheries information, the lack of 
clarity in objectives for management, and the poor understanding of the impacts of 
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management instruments. Until these issues have been addressed decision support systems 
will be able to do little more than focus debate on key issues and identify management 
instruments that are worthy of closer scrutiny. They are certainly not in a position to replace 
analysts with a clear understanding of the issues involved in fisheries management. While 
their role is limited, the benefits of issue clarification are likely to be sufficient to justify 
further development of tools like GoFish. 
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Table 1. Management Instruments. 
Instrument Main world uses Current NZ uses Applicability to  fishing 
Regulatory 
No take zones 
 
Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
 No fishing in specified zones means 
externalities not created 
Marine Reserves Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas, etc, 
protect habitat 
Banks Peninsula, Long 
Bay etc 
Area set aside for preservation of 
marine species 
Closed seasons, areas Protect juveniles, 
spawning areas etc 
Near sub Antarctic 
islands. 
No fishing during designated times and 
/or in prescribed areas. 
Size or sex 
selectivity 
Direct effort away from 
specified ages, sex 
individuals 
Rock lobster, size 
requirement 
Requirement for fishers to return to sea 
all prohibited catch 
Bycatch Reduction 
Devices (BRD) 
Reduce rate of  bycatch 
of fish and other species
Pingers on gill nets Vary technology used while fishing to 
reduce bycatch of fish or other species
Technology ban Prevent externalities 
associated with specific 
harvesting technologies  
Drift netting ban Reduce bycatch by only allowing 
techniques which cause few 
externalities 
Input limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with number 
of potlifts, boat days etc 
 Reduce volume of fishing activity and 
associated externalities 
Catch limitations Reduce externalities 
associated with effort 
Foveaux Strait oysters Limit total harvesting and associated 
externalities 
Retention and 
utilisation 
requirements 
Reduce dumping of target 
and non -target species 
Catching Against 
Anothers Quota 
(CAAQ), Fishing 
Against Anothers 
Quota (FAAQ) 
Allow non target catch to be landed, 
not dumped 
Financial systems 
Taxes Provide incentive to 
reduce, eg, pollution 
Conservation Services 
Levy, applied to some 
non-fish bycatch 
Apply tax to variable inputs, boats, 
outputs, to reduce profits and 
externalities 
Subsidies Reduce costs of inputs R&D assistance Reduce costs of developing BRD 
Environmental 
performance bonds 
Provide financial 
incentive to avoid 
creating externalities  
Mining, biodiversity 
protection 
Provide incentive to not damage habitat 
or marine ecosystem 
Financial 
inducements 
Bribe to behave in 
desired way 
 Financial reward if do not create 
environmental externalities 
IQ, ITQ, IVQ CDQ, 
Share fisheries 
Reduce race to fish NZ QMS Creation of rights reduces need to race, 
provides incentive to maintain asset 
Voluntary approaches 
Co management Right holders draw up 
operating systems 
Challenger Scallop Peer agreements reduce externalities 
Codes of practice Agreed behaviour which 
limits externalities  
HSNO, Agchem Industry develop, adopt, codes which 
limit or preclude externalities 
Accredited 
environmental 
management systems 
Industry develops 
systems - externally 
audited pre-accreditation 
Marine Stewardship 
Council, ISO 14001 
Industry develop, adopt, systems with 
environmental policy which aims to 
limit or preclude externalities 
Conservation 
easements 
Negotiated agreements 
restricting behaviour 
QEII Trust, Ducks 
Unlimited 
Negotiated agreement to not take 
certain actions, eg, create externalities 
Legal Remedies 
Tort law Liability for pollution 
damages 
RMA is a 'strict 
liability' law 
Potential damages claims provide 
incentive to avoid creating 
externalities 
Education and Information Supply 
Publications, guides, 
kits, etc 
numerous Numerous, e.g., 
biodiversity protection 
Informed people change behaviour, 
not create externalities 
Informal regulation, 
e.g., environmental 
reporting 
Toxics Release Inventory 
and corporate 
environmental reporting
 Information release plus community 
pressure, modifies firm behaviour 
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Table 2. Effectiveness of management instruments against individual criteria (scale: 4= totally effective; 0= no effect; -2 is negative) 
Instrument Non-target fish bycatch 
M
arine habitats/seabed 
disturbance 
M
am
m
al bycatch 
B
ird bycatch 
Invertebrate, flora and 
bryophyte bycatch 
P
ollution 
Fish habitats 
M
aori custom
ary rights &
 
practices are protected 
R
ecreationists access to fish 
is m
aintained 
Least net cost to com
m
ercial 
fishers 
Internalisation 
A
voids large distributional 
changes 
The m
anagem
ent m
echanism
 
is cheap to adm
inister 
N
ecessary infrastructure is 
cheap and readily available 
The m
echanism
 has low
 
inform
ation needs 
D
oes not require highly skilled 
m
anagem
ent staff 
E
ffectiveness in non-ideal 
conditions 
The m
anagem
ent m
echanism
 
is easily introduced 
The m
anagem
ent m
echanism
 
is easily m
odified 
No take zones 2 4 3 0 2 0 2 -2 2 3 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 1 3
Marine Reserve 2 4 2 0 2 0 2 -2 2 2 0 3 4 4 4 4 4 0 0
Temporary area closure 2 1 3 3 0 2 1 3 2 2 0 1 4 4 2 4 4 2 4
Closed seasons 2 1 4 3 0 2 0 -1 4 2 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 4
Size or sex selectivity 0 -2 -2 -2 -2 -1 0 4 2 3 0 3 2 4 4 4 1 4 4
Bycatch reduction devices 2 0 4 3 2 0 0 4 4 4 0 2 3 4 4 4 2 4 4
Technology ban 2 3 3 3 3 0 1 4 4 1 0 1 3 2 4 4 3 1 2
Input limitations (quantitative) 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 2 0 4 2 2 1 3 0 1 1
Catch limitations 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 3 2 2 0 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 1
Retention requirements 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 0 3 2
Tax variable inputs 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 4 4 1 3 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 0
Financial inducements 3 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 3 0 0 0
Subsidies 3 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 3 0 0 0
Environmental bonds 1 3 2 1 0 2 1 2 4 2 4 1 1 3 1 3 0 2 2
Property rights 3 2 3 1 1 0 4 0 2 3 4 3 3 2 0 2 0 2 0
Co-management 2 3 3 3 3 0 3 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 2 1 0 3 1
Codes of practice 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 1 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 4
Conservation easements 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 3 3 0 4 4 3 3 0 0 2 0
Tort law 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 2 2 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
Publications/guides 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 0 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 4
Informal regulation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 2 3 3 1 1 4 4 4
Accredited EMS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 -2 4 2 0 4 3 4 4
Figure 1. Purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
 
 
PART II: PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES 
8. Purpose – (1) the purpose of this Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while 
ensuring sustainability. 
 (2) In this Act- 
      “Ensuring sustainability” means- 
(a) Maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the reasonable 
foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic 
environment: 
“Utilisation” means conserving, using, enhancing, and developing fisheries resources 
to enable people to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being. 
9. Environmental principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers 
under this Act, in relation to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take 
into account the following environmental principles: 
(a) Associated or dependent species should be maintained above a level that ensures their 
long-term viability. 
(b) Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be maintained. 
(c) Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management should be protected. 
10. Information principles – All persons exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under 
this Act, in relation to the utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability, shall take into 
account the following information principles: 
(a) Decisions should be based on the best available information: 
(b) Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available in any case: 
(c) Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or 
inadequate: 
The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a reason for postponing 
or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of this Act. 
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Figure 2: Selection of fishery type 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Selection of essential characteristics 
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Figure 4: Allocation of points across criteria 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Decision Support System output 
 
 
